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Where Everybody Knows Your Name 
COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION AND THE FALLACY 
OF THE HIIBEL MAJORITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects the individual from unwarranted 
government intrusion by requiring that a search or seizure be 
predicated upon a finding of probable cause.1  However, not 
every search and seizure necessitates a finding of probable 
cause.  In its landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio,2 the 
United States Supreme Court annunciated an exception to the 
probable cause requirement.  The Terry Court held that a 
police officer acting pursuant to the less-stringent standard of 
“reasonable suspicion” of criminality is permitted to stop a 
person for a period of brief duration in order to take additional 
steps to investigate.3  The Court ruled that this type of 
investigative stop does not infringe upon a citizen’s Fourth 
Amendment right.4  Thus, the concept of a “Terry stop” was 
adopted into American jurisprudence.5  In addition to adopting 
  
 1 The Fourth Amendment states  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized.   
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 3 Id. at 30.  “Reasonable suspicion” is defined as a “particularized and 
objective basis, supported by specific and articuable facts, for suspecting a person of 
criminal activity.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004).  
For example, in Terry, the Court cited, along with other factors, Officer McFadden’s 
(the investigating officer) three decades of police experience, his meticulous observation 
of the three suspects, and the fact that the suspects appeared to be behaving in a 
manner suggestive of a “preface to a ‘stick-up,’” as supporting the conclusion that 
criminal activity was underway.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 5, 28. 
 4 Terry, 392 U.S. at 31. 
 5 A Terry stop is the least intrusive form of constitutional “seizure,” 
requiring only a finding of reasonable suspicion that criminality is afoot.  See id. at 21.  
A Terry stop occurs when, by means of physical force or by show of authority, a police 
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the reasonable suspicion standard, the Terry Court also 
annunciated the “stop and frisk” doctrine, which grants an 
officer, in the course of conducting a valid Terry stop, the 
authority to compel a suspect to submit to a pat-down frisk.6  
However, merely performing a Terry stop does not provide law 
enforcement with a blanket invitation to conduct a compulsory 
frisk.  The Terry Court clearly articulated the rule that the 
police may frisk a suspect only when an officer has a 
reasonably appreciable fear that the particular suspect may be 
“an armed and dangerous individual.”7  Thus, in implementing 
the rules which govern an investigative stop undertaken 
pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion of criminality, the 
Court struck a middle ground of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, balancing the “intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests” with the “promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”8  By strictly regulating the 
duration, scope, and content of the stop, the Court explicitly 
sought to limit the intrusion occasioned on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests, thereby preserving the 
protection of individual integrity which lies at the very 
foundation of the Fourth Amendment.  Unfortunately, in its 
recent decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada,9 the Supreme Court disregarded the Fourth 
Amendment ideals advanced in the Terry decision.   
In a 5-4 opinion, the Hiibel Court upheld the validity of 
a Nevada statute which requires a suspect, under pain of 
arrest and monetary fine, to identify himself by name to law 
enforcement personnel when detained pursuant to the 
reasonable suspicion standard annunciated in Terry.10  
Commonly referred to as stop and identify statutes, compulsory 
identification laws exist in varying composition in some twenty 
states.11  However, as explained throughout the course of this 
  
officer, acting pursuant to a reasonable suspicion, briefly detains an individual such 
that “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”  United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 6 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 9 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 10 Id. at 179, 181, 188-89. 
 11 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2001); ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (1995); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (1997); COLO. REV. Stat. § 16-3-103(1) (2005); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902, 1321(6) (2003); FLA. STAT. § 856.021(2) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. 16-
11-36(b) (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) 
(1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); MO. REV. STAT. 
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Note, Nevada’s statute is particularly troublesome in that it 
requires identification pursuant only to the lessened standard 
of reasonable suspicion.  The intrusion authorized by the 
Nevada statute is of such a substantial degree that it can not 
be reconciled with the Terry Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence and the protections afforded the individual in the 
Fourth Amendment. 
As implicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 
Terry, providing the individual with protection from 
unnecessary, overbroad governmental intrusions is an 
essential component of any truly free society.12   Illustrating the 
ideals advanced in Terry, author Ayn Rand articulated the 
need for the individual to be free from unwarranted intrusions, 
writing “Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy.  
The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his 
tribe.  Civilization is the process of setting man free from 
men.”13  In affirming the constitutionality of Nevada’s 
compulsory identification requirement, the Hiibel Court 
implicitly rejected the idea advanced in Terry and so eloquently 
articulated in Rand’s prose, concerning the outright necessity 
of a relatively substantial degree of anonymity in a society 
which aspires to safeguard the rights and integrity of the 
individual.  In rendering its opinion, the Hiibel majority 
blatantly disregarded the implicit ideals regarding individual 
integrity and personal freedom embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment and espoused by the Terry Court, which sought to 
promote the interests of law enforcement without denigrating 
the rights of the individual.   
This Note will demonstrate that a compulsory 
identification requirement predicated upon a finding of a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality is incompatible with the 
ideals set forth in the Fourth Amendment.  Part II of this Note 
sets forth the factual circumstance which gave rise to the 
dispute at issue in Hiibel.  Part III explains the legal rationale 
advanced in the opinion crafted by the Hiibel majority.  Part IV 
  
§ 84.710(2) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (2001); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-3 (2004); N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (Consol. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 § 
1983 (Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2003). 
 12 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)) (“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and 
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”). 
 13 AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD 715 (25th Anniversary Ed. 1968). 
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of this Note seeks to demonstrate that the Hiibel majority 
failed to adequately comprehend the nature of the intrusion 
occasioned by Nevada’s compulsory identification requirement.  
Part V of this Note will demonstrate that Nevada’s statute is so 
overbroad in scope that it cannot be reconciled with the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Finally, Part VI of this 
Note proposes legislative alternatives which aspire to reach a 
more appropriate middle-ground between the promotion of 
legitimate, socially beneficial law enforcement interests and 
the constitutional protections afforded the individual. 
II. THE FACTS OF HIIBEL  
In order to best comprehend the intrusion constituted 
by compelled identification authorized by a mere reasonable 
suspicion, it is necessary to understand the specific factual 
circumstance in which the dispute at issue in Hiibel arose.  On 
a clear Nevada afternoon, the sheriff’s department of Humboldt 
County, Nevada, received a telephone call from a caller who 
reported seeing a man assault a woman in a silver and red 
G.M.C. truck on Grass Valley Road.14  Deputy Lee Dove was 
dispatched to investigate the caller’s report.  Deputy Dove soon 
located a truck matching the caller’s description parked on the 
side of Grass Valley Road.  The deputy observed skid marks in 
the gravel immediately behind the vehicle, leading him to 
conclude that the truck had come to an abrupt stop.15  A man 
was standing by the rear of the truck and a young woman was 
seated in the passenger compartment.16   
Deputy Dove approached the man, who appeared to be 
inebriated, and explained that he was investigating a reported 
fight.17  The deputy asked the man if he had “any identification 
on [him],” but the man declined to identify himself and instead 
inquired why the deputy wanted to see his identification.18  
Deputy Dove responded that he was conducting an 
investigation and therefore needed to see his identification.  
The unidentified man grew agitated, vehemently insisting that 
he had done nothing wrong.  Deputy Dove explained that he 
wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing on 
  
 14 Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177, 180 (2004). 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 181. 
2006] WHERE EVERYBODY KNOWS YOUR NAME 1425 
the side of the road.19  The man continued to refuse compliance 
with the identification request and began to taunt the deputy.20  
The man placed his hands behind his back, as if waiting to be 
handcuffed, and repeatedly told the deputy to take him to jail.21  
For a period of several minutes Deputy Dove continued, eleven 
times in all, to request identification.22  Each request was 
rebuffed by the unidentified man.  After repeatedly warning 
that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse the 
identification request, the deputy placed the man under 
arrest.23   
It was later determined that the unidentified man 
arrested by Deputy Dove was Larry Dudley Hiibel.24  The state 
of Nevada, citing Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, an 
ordinance which defines the legal rights and duties of a police 
officer in the context of an investigative stop (or Terry stop), 
argued that Hiibel had obstructed Deputy Dove from carrying 
out his duties during an investigative stop.25  The Justice Court 
of Union Township held that in refusing to identify himself, as 
required by Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, Hiibel 
“obstructed and delayed [Deputy] Dove as a public officer in 
attempting to discharge his duty,” thereby violating Nevada 
Revised Statute §199.80.26  On appeal, Hiibel argued that 
Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, which required him to 
identify himself to the investigating officer, violated the rights 
granted him by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
  
 19 Id. 
 20 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181 (2004). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  To view the confrontation between Deputy Dove and Hiibel in its 
entirety, as captured by the dashboard video recorder mounted in Dove’s patrol car, one 
can visit http://papersplease.org/hiibel/facts2.html. 
 24 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181. 
 25 The statute states,  
Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is 
committing or is about to commit a crime . . . .  The officer may detain the 
person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the 
suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad.  Any person so 
detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other 
inquiry of any peace officer.   
NEV. REV. STAT. §171.123 (2001). 
 26 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182. 
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United States Constitution.27  Unmoved by Hiibel’s argument, 
Nevada’s intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling.28  The Supreme Court of Nevada issued a divided 
opinion rejecting Hiibel’s challenge.29  Subsequently, the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.30 
III. THE HIIBEL MAJORITY’S RATIONALE  
In upholding the Nevada statute as constitutional, the 
Supreme Court began its analysis by setting forth the general 
proposition that posing questions to a person suspected of 
criminality comprises an essential component of police 
investigatory powers.31  After retracing fundamental aspects of 
its Terry stop jurisprudence, the Hiibel Court concluded that 
“the principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to 
disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.”32  Thus, the 
Nevada statute, which requires a suspect to identify himself to 
an investigating officer acting pursuant to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminality, was deemed constitutional.33  In 
justifying its conclusion, the Court stated that the 
reasonableness of a Terry stop seizure is determined “by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate government 
interests.”34  The Hiibel Court concluded that the Nevada 
statute satisfied this balancing test because the identity 
request had an “immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, 
and practical demands of a Terry stop.”35  The Court deemed 
the identification request a mere “commonsense inquiry”36 
which served important government interests, including 
allowing the officer to gain knowledge regarding a suspect’s 
past criminal activity, propensity for violence, and history of 
mental disorder. 37  The Court further stated that knowledge of 
  
 27 Id.  The sheer number and complexity of the Firth Amendment issues 
raised in Hiibel prevent in-depth discussion of such concerns within the confines of this 
note. 
 28 Id. at 182. 
 29 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1202, 1207 (Nev. 2002). 
 30 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 540 U.S. 965 (2003). 
 31 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185. 
 32 Id. at 187. 
 33 Id. at 182-83, 189-91. 
 34 Id. at 188 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 35 Id. at 188. 
 36 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189. 
 37 Id. at 186. 
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a suspect’s identity “may help clear a suspect and allow the 
police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.”38  The threat of 
arrest and criminal sanction was deemed necessary in order to 
ensure that the identity request did not become a legal 
nullity.39  The Hiibel majority concluded that because it did not 
change the duration or location of the detention, the 
compulsory name requirement did not alter the fundamental 
nature of the actual Terry stop.40   
Additionally, the Court went on to dispense with the 
argument that the compulsory identification requirement 
allowed law enforcement to perform an end-run around the 
probable cause requirement,41 in effect permitting an officer to 
arrest a person merely for appearing suspicious.42  The majority 
stated that the individual is protected from arbitrary police 
intrusion by the “requirement that a Terry stop must be 
justified at its inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified’ the initial stop.”43  An officer is 
prevented from placing a suspect under arrest for refusing to 
identify himself if the request was not sufficiently related to 
the circumstances justifying the stop.44  The Court concluded 
that Deputy Dove’s request for identification was reasonably 
related to the circumstances which justified the stop.  The 
deputy was seeking to further his investigation into an alleged 
assault and thus was not seeking to obtain an arrest for failure 
to identify after the Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.45  
Thus, Nevada’s compulsory identification requirement, which 
requires a suspect to disclose his identity when detained by a 
law enforcement officer conducting an investigative stop 
pursuant to a finding of reasonable suspicion, was found to be 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  
  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 188. 
 40 Id.. at 188. 
 41 Probable cause exists where the “facts and circumstances within [the 
officer’s] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense had been or is being committed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (Bryan A. 
Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004). 
 42 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188. 
 43 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 44 Id. at 188. 
 45 Id. at 189. 
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IV. THE HIIBEL MAJORITY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
CONSIDER THE NATURE OF THE INTRUSION OCCASIONED 
BY A COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 
A. The Wealth of Information Available to Law 
Enforcement upon Obtaining Knowledge of an 
Individual’s Identity Constitutes a Substantial Intrusion 
The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion 
of legitimate government interests.”46  In Terry, the Court 
explicitly acknowledged that a frisk, when conducted during an 
investigatory stop initiated pursuant only to a mere reasonable 
suspicion, was inherently intrusive.47   Nevertheless, the Court 
ultimately found that such an intrusion was consistent with 
the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment 
because the imposition experienced by the individual was both 
“limited” and “brief”.48   However, Nevada’s compulsory name 
requirement has the potential to be far more invasive than the 
limited pat-down authorized by Terry.   
At first glance, the idea that compelled identification 
constitutes a serious intrusion on the individual, perhaps even 
more so than the degradation experienced by an individual 
made to endure the physical touching of a frisk, may seem a 
somewhat untenable proposition.  After all, even a peripheral 
survey of American jurisprudence reveals the idea that our 
system of legality has long supported the notion that a person’s 
physical sanctity is of the utmost importance.49  However, when 
gauging the intrusion posed by compelled identification, one 
must remember that the frisk authorized by Terry is highly 
constricted and subject to numerous binding restraints.  Since 
the sole justification for the frisk is protection of law 
enforcement personnel and nearby citizenry, the pat-down is 
confined in scope to that which is necessary to determine if the 
  
 46 Id. at 188 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 47 Terry, 392 U.S. at 25 (stating that even a limited search of the outer 
clothing “must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience”). 
 48 Id. at 24-25, 27. 
 49 For example, tort law permits recovery, be it nominal, for even the 
slightest offensive touch or bodily contact sufficient to offend a reasonable sense of 
personal dignity.  See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 21 (2003).   
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suspect is concealing hidden instruments capable of inflicting 
harm upon the officer.50  However, unlike the fleeting, limited, 
highly regulated frisk authorized by the Terry Court, the 
compulsory name requirement at issue in Hiibel authorizes a 
totally unrestrained intrusion.  
Writing during a far simpler time, Shakespeare once 
rhetorically pondered “What’s in a name?”51  In this 
unprecedented era of information, knowledge of one’s name, 
particularly in the hands of law enforcement personnel, has far 
greater significance than at any other time in human history, 
certainly more so than it did in Elizabethan England.  While 
Shakespeare sought to impress upon his audience that a name 
can be relatively inconsequential,52 in the context of a twenty-
first century citizen/police encounter, one’s identity is of the 
utmost significance.  Today’s technological society allows for 
instant access to seemingly endless quantities of highly 
personal information.  A name is no longer just a verbal 
construct used merely for identification purposes, but instead 
provides the password for an innumerable array of both public 
and private cross-referenced databases, each capable of 
exposing the most intimate details of an individual’s life.53  
For instance, Massachusetts State Troopers, recently 
equipped with mobile Black-Berry devices, can instantaneously 
link to databases containing information on an estimated 
ninety-eight percent of adults residing in the United States.54   
  
 50 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“The sole justification of the search in 
the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it 
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover 
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”). 
 51 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 43 (G. 
Blakemore Evans ed., Cambridge University Press) (2003). 
 52 Shakespeare’s Juliet further states “That which we call a rose, by any 
other word would smell as sweet.”  Id.  The contention is that in this passage Juliet 
seeks to imply that a name is an artificial and meaningless convention. See William 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Famous Quotes, http://www.enotes.com/romeo/276 (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2005).  
 53 Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. 
at 3, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554).  Certainly, 
concerns about the degree of information accessible to officers when supplied with a 
suspect’s name were central to Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion, in which he wrote 
“A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about [a] person, 
particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement 
databases.”  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54 Keith Reed, Logan Troopers To Get Roving Database Access, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 22, 2004, at F1.  In the article, Reed quotes Jon Latorella, chief executive 
of LocatePlus, a company that collects records about individuals and rents access to 
this information to various law enforcement agencies, as stating “A name, that’s all [a 
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Provided only with a person’s name, the troopers access a 
wealth of personal information, ranging anywhere from Social 
Security numbers to unlisted telephone numbers to names on a 
lease.55  As information linked to identification has increasingly 
become part of daily life in America, it is now apparent that 
there is seemingly no limit to the information available to 
properly equipped officers of the law.56  With terrorism 
prevention occupying a prominent place of concern for the 
collective law enforcement community, it would seem likely 
that funding will only become more readily available for 
municipalities wishing to upgrade their intelligence gathering 
and information sharing capabilities.57  Such technological 
proliferation has eroded many of the traditional barriers that 
once inhibited efficient information sharing amongst various 
members of the law enforcement community.  For example, 
both New York and Vermont recently announced participation 
in a new multi-jurisdictional law enforcement program which 
provides field officers with the capability to relay information 
about a suspect to a command outpost, which can then 
instantaneously cross-reference such information across 
numerous databases and law enforcement information 
repositories.58  To be certain, information sharing is not a new 
phenomenon.  An informal national network of identification 
systems has long been in development, spurred by the intricate 
intermingling of government databases and identification 
requirements which accompanied several federal legislative 
initiatives that combined demands for identification with 
  
police officer] needs. . . .  [The officer] can find out who you lived with, where you lived, 
anything about you.”  Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Issues, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 697, 706 (2004) (discussing, in the context of the 
potential for a national identification card requirement, the degree to which 
information gathering by both public and private entities has become common-place in 
American society). 
 57 See Brendan Lyons, Albany Initiative Aims to Break Down Barriers to 
Sharing Anti-Terror Reports, TIMES UNION, May 26, 2004, at A1 (reporting that a 
counter terrorism intelligence initiative aimed at facilitating information sharing and 
involving collaboration between federal and state authorities, recently instituted in 
New York and Vermont, might be expanded to other states in the Northeast and across 
the nation). 
 58 Id. In Lyon’s article Robert Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, promised that the newly instituted information systems installed in New 
York and Vermont would provide a “‘seamless flow of intelligence’ to street level cops in 
‘real time.’”  Id. 
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extensive computerized records.59  The effect of this 
intermingling of stored data is that the most intimate details of 
a person’s existence, ranging anywhere from travel habits to 
financial status, are readily accessible to law enforcement 
agencies.  When authorizing a seizure predicated only upon a 
mere reasonable suspicion of criminality, the Terry Court, in all 
likelihood, never intended that their decision would lay the 
framework for such a substantial, seemingly limitless 
intrusion.  
Unfettered access to limitless sources of information 
cannot coexist with the ideals of restraint and individual 
autonomy embodied in the Fourth Amendment and advanced 
in the Terry decision.  For illustrative purposes, consider the 
specific facts of Terry.  Having observed Terry and his cohorts 
behaving in what appeared to be the preparatory stage of an 
armed robbery, it was deemed a perfectly logical and 
appropriate exercise of his law enforcement duties for the 
investigating officer to question the men about their purpose 
for being on the street and their particular interest in the 
jewelry shop’s storefront.  The Terry Court concluded that 
inquiries made during an investigative stop were to be 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified” the initial stop.60  Thus, the Terry Court advanced the 
proposition that investigative detention predicated upon a 
mere finding of reasonable suspicion was to be limited to that 
necessary to confirm or dispel suspicion.61  However, in seeming 
total disregard for the guidelines advanced in Terry, there 
exists no limit whatsoever to the information available when a 
suspect is compelled to reveal his identity.  Thus, the practical 
result of the Hiibel decision is that, rather than limit law 
enforcement inquiry to that necessary to dispel suspicion, 
police are now empowered to gain access to highly personal 
information totally unrelated to the circumstances of the stop.  
Such information might include: where the suspect used to live, 
  
 59 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National 
Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 323 (2002) (identifying legislation 
contributing to the formation of a de facto national information and identification 
system as including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the Transportation Security 
Administration’s ID requirement and Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening 
System). 
 60 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
 61 Id. at 30. 
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where he currently resides, with whom he resides, his phone 
number, his license plate, his financial history, and even his 
travel habits.62  Indeed, this seemingly extensive list 
constitutes merely a sampling of the potential information 
available to law enforcement upon production of one’s 
identity.63   
Respect for personal autonomy, an idea which 
inherently encompasses the ability to remain as a relatively 
anonymous individual absent a truly worthy government 
interest which might justify a limited intrusion, is an essential 
component of the protection of personal integrity at the very 
heart of the Fourth Amendment.  Terry sought to ensure that 
persons detained pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion of 
criminality would not be made to relinquish their entitlement 
of substantial protection from invasions of their individual 
integrity.  Certainly, rational persons concerned with crime 
prevention would agree that access to information is an 
important and necessary component of effective policing.  We 
all are fortunate to live in an age where law enforcement has at 
their disposal numerous technological tools with which they 
can combat societal ills.  However, the sheer wizardry of 
today’s technological age is such that providing a name to law 
enforcement has a fundamentally different connotation than it 
did even a mere 20 years ago.  Due to the special significance 
associated with a name in the hands of law enforcement in this 
era of unprecedented information, compelled identification 
pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion is fundamentally 
incompatible with the protection of personal integrity embodied 
in the Fourth Amendment and advanced in the Terry decision.   
  
 62 See, e.g., Keith Reed, Logan Troopers To Get Roving Database Access, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2004, at F1.  See also Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) et al. at 5, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 
(2004) (No. 03-5554) (commenting that “[p]olice officers today have access to an 
extraordinary range of detailed personal information” and detailing, with specific 
examples, the extensive information available to law enforcement). 
 63 See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et 
al. at 3,5, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554).  The 
amicus brief submitted by the Electronic Privacy Information Center documents the 
vast array of personal information available to law enforcement upon accessing various 
databases.  Id. 
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B. Compelled Identification Leads to a Permanent Record 
of the Citizen/Police Interaction, Thereby Heightening 
the Intrusion Occasioned by Compelled Identification 
Such That It Is Unreasonable 
Furthering the intrusion constituted by the compulsory 
identification requirement at issue in Hiibel is the fact that 
compelled identification leads to a permanent, everlasting 
record of the citizen/police encounter.  There is no disputing 
that all Terry stops, irrespective of the circumstances, 
constitute an intrusion upon the individual.64  However, prior 
to Hiibel, when the limited investigation that accompanied the 
stop failed to create circumstances amounting to probable 
cause which would justify further, heightened police/citizen 
interaction, the individual was free to go on his way.  
Notwithstanding the brief intrusion, and the psychic harm 
which inevitably accompanies the situation where an 
individual is confronted by adversarial law enforcement 
personnel,65 the individual emerged from the encounter 
relatively unscathed.  Barring voluntary identification, there 
was frequently no record of the stop which would forever link 
the individual with his detainment at the hands of police.  
However, following the ruling in Hiibel, an individual detained 
pursuant to reasonable suspicion will no longer possess the 
ability to carry on after the stop as a relatively anonymous 
individual.  
When an investigative stop pursuant to reasonable 
suspicion is accompanied by a compulsory identification 
requirement, every such detention will result in a permanent 
record of the encounter.  According to Mary Hoffman, a staff 
attorney with the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the 
reality of a compulsory identification requirement like that at 
issue in Hiibel is that every Terry stop will be recorded and 
added to information gathering systems.66  Therefore, stop and 
  
 64 Chief Justice Warren opinioned that a Terry stop, particularly when 
accompanied by a frisk, is a “severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal 
security.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.  Justice Warren further stated “it must surely be 
an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.” Id. at 25.   
 65 See Steinbock, supra note 56 at 740 (“Identification checkpoints, it may be 
argued, have an additional subjective effect on a grand scale: the psychic harm to free 
people of having to ‘show your papers’. . . .”).   
 66 Ms. Hofman stated “Every little time something like this happens, the 
police question you and want to know who you are, it’s an incident that gets put into a 
database.  And there will be a record of it thereafter, regardless of whether you did 
anything wrong.”  Gabriel Syme, Fighting For Right Not to Show ID, White Rose 
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identify statutes not only provide law enforcement with an 
opportunity to check existing databases, they also generate 
new data by continuously inputting additional, increasingly 
detailed information about the detained individual.67  Every 
subsequent Terry stop would present a new opportunity for law 
enforcement to input additional information into database 
receptacles, thereby facilitating increased government 
surveillance of a person’s behavior.68   Such intrusive data 
compilation resulting from an investigatory stop greatly 
increases the imposition experienced by the individual 
subjected to the encounter.69  
Feelings of a loss of personal anonymity are especially 
heightened when the investigative detainment fails to escalate 
to a degree warranting arrest.  The individual, having already 
endured the harrowing experience of detention by adversarial 
authorities, is further intruded upon in that they compile a 
documented police record, even though his behavior proved 
entirely insufficient to warrant an arrest, let alone an 
indictment or conviction.70  While it recognized that an 
investigatory stop pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion was 
an “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience,”71 the Terry Court nevertheless authorized 
detainment pursuant to a reasonable suspicion of criminality 
because it deemed the intrusion upon the individual to be both 
“brief” and “limited.”72  However, contrary to Terry, compelled 
identification pursuant only to a mere reasonable suspicion of 
criminality has the practical effect of turning a highly 
restrained intrusion into an everlasting, ceaseless intrusion in 
the form of  a permanent police record which will forever follow 
  
Privacy Archives, available at http://whiterose.samizdata.net/archives/005632.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
 67 Steinbock, supra note 56, at 744-58 (discussing, in the context of the 
potential for a national identification card requirement, the various ways in which data 
is generated, collected, and retained). 
 68 Id. at 709 (“Each identification encounter would be an occasion to add 
information to the central database, facilitating government surveillance of movement 
and activity.”). 
 69 Id. at 755 (“There is no question that retaining data from a stop adds to its 
intrusiveness when that data is linked to a particular person.”).   
 70 Id. at 755 (Commenting that feelings of intrusion become especially 
palpable when an “investigative stop does not lead to arrest; an individual could 
acquire a police ‘record’ for activities that were not criminal enough to produce an 
arrest, much less a conviction.”). 
 71 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968). 
 72 Id. at 25-26. 
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the individual.73  Such an effect is entirely contrary to the 
implicit principles of government restraint and protection from 
over-intrusive, unreasonable invasions of individual autonomy 
which lie at the very heart of the Terry Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
C. The Hiibel Majority Failed to Consider the Degree to 
Which the Intrusion Occasioned by a Compulsory 
Identification Requirement Will Disproportionately 
Affect Minority Citizenry 
The intrusiveness of a statute authorizing compelled 
identification pursuant to reasonable suspicion, especially in 
light of the potential for unfettered, highly invasive data 
collection, will disproportionately affect the minority citizenry.  
The Warren Court, which decided Terry, presided during one of 
the most trying periods in American history74 and thus was 
greatly influenced by the social landscape of the time.  The 
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, in particular its 
decision in Terry, was swayed by the civil rights movement 
which had come to dominate the headlines throughout the 
1950’s and 1960’s.75  A prominent concern in the struggle for 
racial equality was the widespread, pervasive mistreatment of 
African-Americans perpetrated by police departments across 
the nation.76  The abuses perpetrated on African-Americans by 
  
 73 Steinbock, supra note 56, at 755 (“[D]ata collection and retention clearly 
adds to the imposition of a Terry stop.  Now, instead of the ‘brief intrusion’ described by 
the Court in Terry, the individual has a ‘brief intrusion’ plus an endless record, not only 
of having been in a particular place at a particular time but also perhaps of having 
generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Because Terry was decided by 
balancing the governmental need for investigative stops against their degree of 
individual intrusion, this additional imposition threatens to upset Terry’s balance.”). 
 74 David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (commenting that when Terry reached the Supreme Court, 
“American society seemed to be fraying at the edges.  A palpable climate of unrest had 
settled over the nation.”). 
 75 Id. at 43 (“[T]he civil rights struggles of the 1950’s and 1960’s were part of 
the reason (if not the reason) for the Warren Court’s concern with criminal procedure 
in general and with stop and frisks in particular.”); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court 
and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1969) (“The Court’s concern with 
criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil 
rights.”). 
 76 Harris, supra note 74, at 8 (discussing the mistreatment of African-
Americans by police as a backdrop for the Terry decision); Pye, supre note 75, at 256 
(“If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it required not 
only that the poor [African-American] be permitted to vote and to attend school with 
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as 
well as posses, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.”). 
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law enforcement authorities, particularly through the rampant 
use of over-aggressive, unregulated stop and frisks, had come 
to dominate the collective American consciousness.  The 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice directly acknowledged the 
proliferation of such ill-treatment inflicted upon minorities by 
police conducting investigatory stops, stating: “Misuse of field 
interrogations . . . is causing serious friction with minority 
groups in many localities.  This is becoming particularly true 
as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive patrols’ in which 
officers are encouraged to routinely stop and question persons 
on the street . . . .”77  Through the annunciation of clear 
constitutional guidelines regulating investigatory stops, the 
Terry Court sought to revitalize the deteriorating relationship 
between African-Americans and the law enforcement 
community.78  However, a compulsory identification 
requirement such as that which exists in Nevada is 
inconsistent with the inherent ideals of Terry in that such 
statutes will only heighten tensions between minorities and the 
police, thereby directly escalating the very problem the Terry 
Court intended to combat.   
Unfortunately, racism in the criminal justice system, 
especially in the context of contemporary stop and frisk law, is 
an intractable, highly corrosive social ill.  Numerous studies 
have demonstrated that in practice, police frequently utilize 
race as a proxy for criminality when deciding whether to stop a 
potential suspect.79  Further escalating the perception of an 
apparent racial bias in the methodology of criminal law 
enforcement, contemporary criminal procedure jurisprudence 
has begun to whittle away at the Terry Court’s attempt to 
improve minority/police relations through the establishment of 
  
 77 TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE  
184 (1967).  
 78 See Pye, supra note 75, at 256 (commenting that the Warren Court could 
not “ignore the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore 
the brunt of most unlawful police activity”). 
 79 Harris, supra note 74, at 4.  See also MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., 
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY, 149-50 (2003) (reporting, 
in the context of a discussion concerning the findings of various studies documenting 
the disproportionate representation of racial minorities in the American criminal 
justice system, that “blacks and those otherwise fitting the delinquent stereotype were 
more likely to be stopped and interrogated ‘often even in the absence of evidence that 
an offense has been committed’”); Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a 
Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 214 (1983) (“Police still view race as an important factor in 
the decision to detain a suspect.”).     
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strict guidelines regulating investigatory stops not predicated 
upon a finding of probable cause.80  A prime example of such 
activity can be seen in the fact that courts dispersed 
throughout the nation have upheld Terry stops based merely on 
an individual’s presence in a high-crime locale, coupled with an 
observation of the individual exhibiting evasive behavior 
towards the police.81  The result of this judicial acquiescence, of 
what, at best, might be termed questionable justification for an 
investigative stop is that a vastly inordinate number of Terry 
stops now occur in predominately minority neighborhoods, 
which in urban settings tend to have a higher crime rate.82  
Authorizing the “location plus evasion matrix” as a justification 
for the finding of a reasonable suspicion ignores the well 
documented fact that many persons of color residing in the 
United States, for historic reasons, entertain an entirely 
reasonable fear of police authority.83  Thus, such persons are 
behaving rationally when they seek to employ evasive 
measures designed to avoid unnecessary, unwarranted police 
  
 80 David A. Harris, Factors For Reasonable Suspicion, When Black and Poor 
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (explaining that in the twenty 
five years that followed the decision in Terry, case law gradually began to exceedingly 
require less evidence to justify a investigative stop). 
 81 Id. at 680 (1994).  See also United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (discussing how under federal law principles, the “location plus evasion 
matrix” is sufficient to justify police intrusion).  Alexander’s car was double-parked in a 
neighborhood known for the sale of illicit narcotics.  Upon emerging from a residence, 
Alexander got in his car and proceeded to drive while frequently looking in the rear 
view mirror, allegedly indicating a fear of law enforcement surveillance, thereby 
providing sufficient justification for the resultant Terry stop conducted by federal 
agents under the authority of the Drug Enforcement Agency.  Id.  New York courts 
have been rather progressive on this issue in that the state judiciary has recognized 
the damaging effect of upholding such a basis for reasonable suspicion and accordingly 
have exercised resistance to the theory that location plus evasion is sufficient to justify 
an investigatory stop. See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (1989) (cautioning 
against placing excessive weight on an individual’s location in finding reasonable 
suspicion and stating that location “cannot serve as the justification for untoward or 
excessive police behavior against those of our citizens who happen to live, work, or 
travel in what are characterized as ‘high crime areas.’”); People v. Powell, 667 N.Y.S.2d 
725, 728 (1998) (finding insufficient grounds for a determination of reasonable 
suspicion where stop was based on defendant’s alleged evasive answers to police 
questioning along with an observation of defendant walking swiftly with stiff arm 
movements in a high crime area); In re James, 559 N.E.2d 1273, 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 
114, 115 (1990) (stop of defendant was not justified where defendant was carrying a 
heavy bag in an area prone to drug crime and weapons activity and defendant’s 
companions fled upon the appearance of police officers). 
 82 Harris, supra note 80, at 660 (stating that minorities are more likely to live 
in “so-called high crime areas”). 
 83 Id. at 681 (Noting that blacks and Hispanics have “become caught in a 
vicious cycle . . . .  Feeling understandably harassed, they wish to avoid the police and 
act accordingly.  This evasive behavior in (their own) high crime neighborhoods gives 
the police that much more power to stop and frisk.”). 
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interaction.  Use of police tactics which dictate that a subclass 
of citizens will be stopped more often merely because of their 
race or ethnicity forces the minority populace to pay a far 
higher price, in terms of sacrifice of individual integrity and 
loss of autonomy, than their white counterparts.84  The Hiibel 
ruling will only exacerbate this unfair disposition.  
As acknowledged by the Terry Court, but nevertheless 
inexplicably disregarded by the majority in Hiibel, feelings of 
unwarranted harassment heighten tensions between minority 
citizens and police.85  Such unrest, already heightened by 
contemporary Terry stop procedures which disproportionately 
target persons of color, will be substantially escalated due to 
the Hiibel ruling.   Minority citizens will now have to endure 
not only the denigration associated with repeated, 
unwarranted investigatory stops, but will also be forced to 
tolerate the additional degradation of compelled identification.  
When confronted with persistent police harassment, much of 
the psychological armor which protects one’s self-dignity is 
comprised of the ability to remain anonymous.  The Supreme 
Court implicitly seemed to agree with such a rationale, when, 
prior to its decision in Hiibel, the Court stated that Terry stops 
have a “non-threatening” character, in part because the 
detained suspect “is not obliged to respond.”86  Indeed, even the 
individual willing to accept subjection to a Terry stop as a 
necessary intrusion in a society which seeks to promote 
obedience of the law surely takes great solace in the knowledge 
that when the detainment is over, he can, at the very least, go 
on his way in a state of relative anonymity.  Hiibel has the 
effect of stripping away this last remaining refuge for minority 
citizens.  
It seems an entirely logical conclusion that, especially in 
blighted neighborhoods, a beat officer’s knowledge of a person’s 
identity is a powerful law enforcement tool, so much so that it 
  
 84 See Harris, supra note 74, at 43-44. 
 85 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (stating that African-Americans have 
been subjected to “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police 
community”). 
 86 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (explaining why Terry 
stops do not require the investigating officer to issue Miranda warnings).  The Hiibel 
majority held that Berkemer was not controlling because the cited statement merely 
indicated that the Fourth Amendment itself cannot compel a suspect to answer 
questions.  The source of the legal obligation at issue in Hiibel arose not from the 
Fourth Amendment, but from a state statute.  Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 
U.S. 177, 187 (2004). 
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can lead to misuse and outright abuse.87  Investigative 
reporting performed by the Los Angeles Times in the wake of 
erupting racial tensions in the city’s minority communities 
revealed a commonly employed police tactic described by local 
black residents as “The Routine.”88  Young black males were 
made to kneel with their fingers laced behind their head while 
officers performed a pat-down frisk and conducted an 
investigation.89  Even where such interaction may fail to result 
in arrest, it would seem that use of such tactics present police 
officers with the opportunity to incrementally increase their 
knowledge of suspected criminals and the activities in which 
they engage.  Certainly, it is of prominent importance that 
police officers have the ability to collect information which will 
aid in combating crime.90  However, such a mindset produces 
an inevitable paradox in that the “the more intrusive data 
collection and retention, the greater its effectiveness is likely to 
be.”91  Thus, even the most well-meaning members of the law 
enforcement community will inevitably feel the need to collect 
and retain ever increasing amounts of information about an 
individual suspect.  This is quite troubling in that it disregards 
the fact that the actual number of criminals dispersed in the 
minority populace is undoubtedly relatively small, and 
furthermore, the number likely to be successfully apprehended 
by a Terry stop accompanied by compelled identification is even 
smaller.92  The likelihood for mistaken stops that nevertheless 
result in the loss of anonymity and the input of information 
regarding an entirely innocent individual, an individual 
stopped, at least in part, because of ethnicity and the socio-
  
 87 See Anne M. Coughlin, Simple Question, Big Implications, WASH. POST, 
March 28, 2004, at B5 (speculating that police seeking to combat crime might 
unnecessarily compel identification in a broad array of instances, including those 
where the grounds for suspicion rests primarily upon the suspect’s race).  
 88 Harris, supra note 74, at 3. 
 89 Id. at 3-4. 
 90 In theory, the greater the amount of information available to law 
enforcement, the more likely it is that police will be able to anticipate and prevent 
crime. See Steinbock, supra note 56, at 736 (discussing, in the context of national 
identity cards, collection of data in an effort to create a terrorist profile in order to foil 
terrorist activity). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Cf. id. at 735-36 (commenting, within the context of a national 
identification requirement as a means of terrorism prevention, that identification 
requirements would have a relatively miniscule success rate because the number of 
terrorists dispersed amongst the populace is small, and the number of those likely to be 
apprehended by an identification requirement is even smaller). 
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economic status of their community, is sure to be a far too 
frequent occurrence.93   
Minorities in the United States, particularly African-
Americans, have endured a long, tragic legacy of police abuse 
and ill-treatment.  The Terry Court sought to combat such 
unfair police practices when it enacted strict guidelines to 
regulate police investigatory stops predicated upon a mere 
suspicion of criminality.  Hiibel, in authorizing a practice that 
will inevitably worsen police/minority relations through the 
disproportionate infliction of an unquantifiable, but 
nevertheless harmful intrusion upon minority citizens, 
represents a movement toward the very worst of pre-Terry 
police/citizen interaction.  
D. Compelled Identification Inhibits Individual 
Spontaneity, Thereby Greatly Amplifying the Intrusion 
The noxious effect of a statute like that at issue in 
Hiibel, while disproportionately effecting people of color, will 
not be limited to predominately minority communities.  The 
pervasive feelings of intrusiveness that accompany a 
compulsory identification requirement are far-reaching and are 
likely to have the effect of curbing the spontaneity of existence 
and the spirit of unencumbered individuality which has long 
been an essential characteristic of life in the United States.  
Freedom of existence, the ability to live, associate, and move 
about free from over-bearing government intrusion is a key 
component of the American existence.94  In accordance with this 
  
 93 See id. (discussing how even with all the data available through terrorist 
profiling software like CAPPS, a threat-detection passenger screening system 
employed by commercial airlines operating in the United States, the occurrence of 
“false positives”  is frequent). 
 94 Americans have long cherished the ability to move freely, anonymously, 
and unfettered throughout the vast confines of the nation’s territories.  Since the 
earliest days of our country Americans have possessed an explorative, free-spirited 
nature.  Lewis and Clark’s historic trek across the continent is forever engrained in 
American lore.  See, e.g., STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER 
LEWIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1996).  Famed 
American author Jack Kerouac documented a generation of free-spirited beatniks who 
journeyed across the continent in search of adventure and self-enlightenment, thereby 
continuing the American tradition of spontaneity of existence.  See, e.g., JACK 
KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (1957).  The proliferation of the automobile, an invention 
which would eventually take its place as a staple of American life, coupled with the 
boost in interstate highway construction undertaken by the Eisenhower 
administration, spurred countless individuals to take to “Route 66” and travel the 
nation unfettered.  See, e.g., TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS: BUILDING THE 
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deeply cherished tradition, the judiciary has consistently 
acknowledged the fundamental role that freedom of movement 
and spontaneity of existence has long occupied in our society.95 
However, compulsory identification requirements threaten to 
stifle the unbridled existence which comprises an essential 
component of American life.  The compulsory identification 
requirement at issue in Hiibel has the adverse effect of 
substantially constricting freedom of movement and 
suppressing spontaneity of existence, thereby heightening the 
intrusion imposed upon the individual to a level entirely 
inconsistent with the ideals espoused in the Fourth 
Amendment and advanced in Terry. 
Stop and identify statutes, and their close relative, anti-
loitering statutes, have their roots in centuries old English 
laws specifically formulated to limit the behavior and stifle the 
movement of society’s least fortunate.96  Thus, the history of 
  
INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LIFE 86-91 (1997); MICHAEL WALLIS, 
ROUTE 66: THE MOTHER ROAD  2 (1990).  
 95 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (establishing that the 
right to travel is a fundamental right in holding unconstitutional a California statutory 
provision which denied welfare assistance to residents who have not resided within the 
given jurisdiction for at least one year).  The Shapiro court stated: 
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our 
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be 
free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by 
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this 
movement.  
Id. at 629.  See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (citing the burden and 
restriction on interstate travel occasioned by racial discrimination in restaurants in 
finding that eateries which refused to serve African-American patrons were in violation 
of the Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  See also Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972): 
Persons “wandering or strolling” from place to place have been extolled by 
Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay….[T]hese activities are historically part 
of the amenities of life as we have known them.  They are not mentioned in 
the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.  These unwritten amenities have 
been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and 
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.  These amenities have dignified the 
right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the 
right to defy submissiveness.  They have encouraged lives of high spirits 
rather than hushed, suffocated silence.  They are embedded in Walt 
Whitman’s writings, especially in his “Song of the Open Road.”  They are 
reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel Lindsay’s “I Want to Go Wandering”, and 
by Henry David Thoreau. 
 96 Jocelyn L. Santo, Down on the Corner: An Analysis of Gang-Related 
Antiloitering Laws, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 269, 270-71 (2000) (discussing how the demise 
of feudal Europe created a population of impoverished vagrants who wandered the 
streets in search of work, prompting the ruling class to enact laws targeting this 
perceived “menace to society”). 
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compelled identification statutes reveals that they were first 
promulgated with the explicit intention of limiting the 
movement and activities of individuals deemed undesirable.  
Today, compulsory identification requirements remain an 
effective way to confine the populace and restrict the 
individual’s existence.  Requests for identification inflict 
substantial, be it unquantifiable, “psychic harm” on the 
individual in that such requests inevitably damage one’s sense 
of personal freedom.97  The idea that compelled identification 
has become an omnipresent component of the societal 
landscape inevitably reduces one’s invaluable feeling of general 
liberty.98  Even individuals entirely innocent of wrongdoing, but 
nevertheless unfortunate enough to elicit a reasonable 
suspicion of criminality in well-intentioned law enforcement 
officers, will inevitably experience considerable trepidation at 
the prospect of having to identify oneself.99  The perception that 
the government might have cause to document one’s 
movements and activities has the potential to dramatically 
alter behavioral patterns, “not for fear of being caught doing 
something illegal but because [individuals are] reluctant to 
contribute to a permanent, government-held record of their 
actions.”100  The unavoidable effect is suppression of one’s 
inquisitive nature and the gradual reduction of individual 
vitality and spontaneity.  This imposition on the conscience 
inevitably leads society down the path of a more Orwellian 
existence.  Such a lifestyle not only stands juxtaposed with the 
implicit ideals contained in the Fourth Amendment as 
  
 97 Steinbock, supra note 56, at 740 (“Identification checkpoints, it may be 
argued, have an additional subjective effect on a grand scale: the psychic harm to free 
people of having to ‘show your papers.’”).  While the cited portion of Steinbock’s 
commentary focuses on the potential effects of law enforcement checkpoints established 
to combat crime and primarily deals with demands for the production of tangible 
identity documents (a demand outside the context of Hiibel), I submit that the effects 
on the individual consciousness and sense of freedom detailed by Steinbock are highly 
relevant to the overall discussion of compulsory identification requirements. 
 98 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First 
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 
131 (2002) (concluding that an appropriate definition of privacy must account for a 
person’s emotional and psychological  response to surveillance). 
 99 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (discussing the 
inevitable subjective feelings of intrusion that arise in an innocent motorist compelled 
to stop at a sobriety checkpoint). 
 100 See Steinbock, supra note 56, at 745.  See also, Christopher Slobogin, 
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 
MISS. L.J. 213, 251 (2002) (discussing how persons fearful of the potential for 
government surveillance tend to develop a reduced sense of individualism which can 
inhibit their conduct, associations, and activities). 
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espoused in Terry, but also is entirely incompatible with the 
fundamental nature of the American existence.  
A free society which purports to value the sanctity of the 
individual must protect the ability to move and associate in 
relative anonymity without the fear of unreasonable 
government intrusion.  Indeed, some of the worst regimes 
mankind has ever known utilized identification requirements 
to maintain tabs on the citizenry, thereby limiting the ability to 
associate freely and restricting all movement and activity 
deemed undesirable.101  To be certain, the compulsory 
identification requirement at issue in Hiibel is a far cry from 
the oppression associated with authoritative regimes like that 
which presided in the former Soviet Union and the satellite 
states of the Eastern European communist bloc.  Nevertheless, 
even a peripheral study of world history reveals that freedom of 
movement, and the invaluable spontaneity of existence which 
inherently accompanies such freedom, is inevitably stifled 
when there exists a persistent fear of having to identify oneself 
to state authorities.  The Hiibel majority failed to adequately 
consider the ramifications of Nevada’s compulsory 
identification requirement on a person’s subjective feelings of 
constriction, and the degree to which this emotional response 
will manifest itself by inhibiting the extemporaneousness 
movement which has long constituted an essential component 
of American life.  Such imposition upon the individual weighs 
heavily in upsetting the delicate balance between legitimate 
state interest and intrusion upon personal sanctity which the 
Terry Court sought to strike when it authorized a brief and 
substantially restrained intrusion pursuant to a mere 
reasonable suspicion. 
  
 101 Perhaps one of the most enduring impressions of a restricted populace is 
that of the infamous Berlin Wall, and numerous other images of the oppression 
associated with the satellite states of the former Soviet Union.  However, demands for 
identification also played a role in limiting the movement of blacks in segregated South 
Africa and were utilized by the Nazis to prevent the flight of Holocaust victims.  See 
Sobel, supra note 59, at 344-47. 
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V. THE COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION STATUTE AT ISSUE IN 
HIIBEL IS FAR TOO BROAD IN SCOPE 
A. The Ideals of the Fourth Amendment As Advanced in 
Terry Demand That a Compulsory Identification Statute 
Require Additional Justification Beyond That Which 
Occasioned the Initial Investigative Stop 
The compelled identification requirement at issue in 
Hiibel requires identification from a detained suspect without 
any individualized justification and therefore is incompatible 
with the Terry Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  The 
Terry Court explicitly declined to empower police with an 
automatic right to frisk during every investigatory stop.102  
Rather, in a carefully formulated opinion, the Court clearly 
outlined the limited circumstances in which officers were 
permitted to perform a frisk pursuant to a finding of 
reasonable suspicion.103  While an officer’s finding of reasonable 
suspicion was deemed a sufficient predicate for performing the 
initial stop, if the officer wished to heighten the intrusive 
nature of the investigation by performing a frisk, additional 
justification beyond that which occasioned the stop was 
required.104  Nevertheless, in blatant disregard for the Terry 
Court’s requirement of heightened justification when an 
investigative stop escalates in intrusiveness, the Nevada 
statute authorizes the automatic right to demand identification 
during every investigative stop without any additional 
justification.  Thus, the blanket identification requirement at 
issue in Hiibel is contrary to the Fourth Amendment principles 
advanced by Terry because it authorizes an automatic 
identification requirement without requiring any additional 
justification from the investigating officer.   
The Terry Court intentionally stopped far short of 
authorizing an automatic right to frisk, instead holding that a 
frisk was constitutionally permissible only if the “officer is 
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
  
 102 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 103 Id. (limiting the right to frisk to instances where the police officer 
concludes that “the persons with whom he is dealing with may be armed and presently 
dangerous” and “where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel 
[the] reasonable fear for [the officer’s] safety or others’ safety”). 
 104 Id. 
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presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”105  The 
requirement of a reasonable fear for officer safety as a 
precondition for a frisk is not a mere formality.  An officer’s 
“street sense,” no matter how well honed, when standing alone, 
is insufficient to justify a frisk.106  Thus, the officer must be able 
to articulate his basis for believing that crime is afoot and is 
additionally required to articulate his basis for believing that a 
frisk of the suspect was warranted.107  This requirement of a 
reasonable, articulable basis for conducting a frisk, beyond that 
which provoked the initial investigatory stop, has the effect of 
preventing overbroad, unnecessary, and unwarranted 
intrusions.  The Terry Court stated that the “demand for 
specificity in the information upon which police action is 
predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.”108  By failing to require an 
additional individualized justification for the compelled 
identification requirement, the Hiibel Court disregarded the 
Terry Court’s explicit decree requiring police to sufficiently 
justify actions which encroach on Fourth Amendment 
guarantees. 
Echoing concerns identical to those raised by the 
authors of Terry, officer safety was an issue of great 
prominence for the drafters of the Hiibel opinion.  Writing on 
behalf of the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded: 
Obtaining a suspect’s name . . . serves important government 
interests.  Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a 
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or 
mental disorder . . . .  Officers called to investigate domestic disputes 
need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess . . . the 
threat to their own safety . . . .109 
Justice Kennedy is indeed correct in that the more 
information possessed by investigating officers, the more likely 
it is that an investigation can be conducted safely.  However, 
even if compelling identification might increase officer safety 
incrementally in certain instances, the desire to protect and 
promote law enforcement safety does not permit circumvention 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The Terry Court mandated that 
police action undertaken during an investigatory stop 
  
 105 Id. at 24. 
 106 See Harris, supra note 80, at 13. 
 107 Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33. 
 108 Id. at 21 n.18. 
 109 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. 
1446 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
conducted pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion requires 
explicit justification.110 However, the Nevada statute fails to 
require any such justification,111 instead compelling 
identification from all detained suspects on the mere hunch 
that knowledge of identity might possibly reveal that a certain 
individual poses a danger.  Such encroachment on the 
individual, requiring no reasonable justification whatsoever, 
can not be aligned with the standards of the Fourth 
Amendment as advanced in Terry. 
All suspects are not equally dangerous, and therefore all 
suspects cannot be treated as such.  In Delaware v. Prouse the 
Supreme Court stated that stopping an automobile and 
detaining the driver in order to verify license and registration 
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there exists 
no articulable, reasonable suspicion that the particular 
motorist is unlicensed or that the automobile is unregistered.112  
The holding in Prouse was dictated, at least in great part, by 
the fact that the police action at issue was not based upon “an 
appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular 
automobile,” thereby inviting “intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches.”113  The Prouse Court went on to state 
that the police had chosen to rely on the flawed hypothesis that 
“stopping apparently safe drivers is necessary only because the 
danger presented by some drivers is not observable at the time 
of the stop.”114  The automatic identification requirement in 
Hiibel has the effect of doing exactly that which the Court so 
vehemently proscribed in Prouse.  Admittedly, the statute in 
Hiibel is tailored to a finding of reasonable suspicion, while the 
officer who conducted the stop in Prouse was not acting 
pursuant to any suspicion of criminal activity.  However, the 
logic advanced in the Prouse opinion is intuitively quite 
analogous to the issues presented by Hiibel.  Demanding 
identification from all suspects stopped during a Terry stop, 
absent a finding of some factual basis which confirms the 
necessity for such a demand, is equivalent to stopping 
motorists on the bare hunch that they may be unlicensed or 
  
 110 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (describing the necessary justification for a stop 
and detailing the instances in which police may perform a frisk). 
 111 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2001). 
 112 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 113 Id. at 661. 
 114 Id. 
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otherwise unfit to operate a vehicle.  Such a policy, in which all 
are made to endure an intrusion on the bare chance that an 
officer might learn of an individual posing a threat, relies on 
the very same “inarticulate hunches” that the Supreme Court 
explicitly characterized as an insufficient justification for police 
intrusion.   
It is an unfortunate reality that present societal 
conditions are such that police officers routinely expose 
themselves to countless risks while pursuing their daily law 
enforcement duties.  For such service and sacrifice, society 
should be eternally grateful.  Nevertheless, the idea that a 
blanket, automatic compulsory identification requirement may, 
in certain instances, lessen the risks confronting an officer 
performing an investigatory stop is insufficient to supercede 
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.  When the Terry 
Court rendered its decision requiring additional justification 
before a suspect could be compelled to undergo a frisk, the 
Court acknowledged that it was well aware of the numerous 
dangers confronting the brave men and women of law 
enforcement.115  However, even when confronted with the 
rampant infliction of violence on the nation’s police officers, the 
Terry Court refused to articulate a rule authorizing an officer 
conducting an investigatory stop the automatic right to frisk.  
Instead, the Terry Court sought to remain faithful to the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
intrusions while appeasing the competing interests which arise 
from an investigative stop.116  In authorizing compelled 
identification without requiring any additional justification, 
the Hiibel majority disregarded the Fourth Amendment ideals 
espoused in Terry regarding the need for additional 
justification when police seek to undertake action during an 
investigative stop which will heighten the intrusion 
experienced by the individual.  
  
 115 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (“American criminals have a long tradition of 
armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are 
killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.  Virtually all of these 
deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.”).  
The Court acknowledged that in the first half of the 1960’s alone, some several 
hundred police officers were killed while performing their law enforcement duties.  Id. 
at 24 n.21. 
 116 The Court stated that the dual interests of consequence in Terry were “the 
neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative circumstance and the 
sanctity of the individual.” Id. at 26.   
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B. The Statute at Issue in Hiibel is Insufficiently Tailored 
in That It Compels Identification Even When Entirely 
Unwarranted 
The Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel is far too broad in 
scope because it requires identification from all suspects 
detained pursuant to a reasonable suspicion, irrespective of the 
circumstances surrounding the stop.  The blanket application 
of the compelled identification statute disregards the fact that 
many times an officer confronting a suspect will have his 
suspicion quickly dispelled, at which time compelled 
identification can no longer be said to be consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.  For 
instance, suppose upon being detained by the investigating 
officer, Terry stated that he was simply having a great deal of 
trouble selecting an engagement ring from the impressive 
selection in the store’s display window.  Assuming the 
investigating officer found Terry’s explanation for his behavior 
entirely credible and therefore no longer suspected Terry of 
“casing” the storefront in preparation for a robbery, the officer 
would be without the authority to continue the investigative 
detention.  The reasonable suspicion which justified the initial 
stop having dissipated, continued detainment would be 
unreasonable.   
A similar situation can easily be hypothesized in the 
factual circumstances of Hiibel.  As previously discussed, 
Deputy Dove approached Larry Hiibel in order to investigate 
an alleged assault of the female passenger in the truck.117  For 
illustrative purposes, consider the following hypothetical which 
slightly alters the facts of the investigative stop at issue in 
Hiibel.  Suppose that rather than being entirely uncooperative, 
Hiibel instead vehemently insisted to Deputy Dove that an 
assault had not taken place.  His daughter’s screams were not 
cries of pain or alarm, but merely joyous exaltations that could 
have easily been misinterpreted by a concerned, but 
uninformed, member of the public.  Assume further that 
Hiibel’s explanation is corroborated in full by his daughter.  
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty associated with 
gauging the creditability of statements made by the possible 
victim of a violent domestic dispute, assuming that Deputy 
Dove’s experience as an officer led him to conclude that Hiibel’s 
  
 117 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 180 (2004). 
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explanation was entirely truthful, there would no longer be any 
reasonable suspicion of criminality afoot.  When suspicion of 
criminality dissipates, there is no authority to continue an 
investigative detainment, let alone compel identification.  
It is a settled principle of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence that police officers are not permitted to rely upon 
a citizen’s refusal to cooperate to furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification required to authorize detention or 
seizure.118  However, the statute at issue in Hiibel authorizes 
exactly that.  Even if the officer’s suspicion quickly dissipates 
upon undertaking an investigation, identification can still 
nevertheless be compelled.  A person who has alleviated the 
officer’s suspicions of possible criminal behavior can 
nevertheless be made to provide identification or face arrest 
and criminal sanction.119   
Such an occurrence will not be confined to classroom 
hypotheticals.  Officers frequently stop persons who upon 
detainment are found to have been engaging in entirely lawful 
behavior.  For example, in Martiszus v. Washington County, an 
officer patrolling in a police cruiser in the early morning hours 
observed an automobile stopped on the shoulder of the road 
with what appeared to be a leg emerging from the open driver-
side door.120  The officer believed that the vehicle’s occupant 
might be drunk or perhaps involved in an assault.  However, 
when the officer instituted an investigation, the suspect 
immediately explained that he was merely performing repairs 
on his automobile, an explanation clearly corroborated by the 
circumstances of the encounter (suspect was holding tools, 
appeared to be in the process of making repairs, etc.). 121  
Nevertheless, apparently perturbed by the motorist’s abrasive 
tone and dismissive demeanor, the officer continued with the 
Terry stop even after the suspect had promptly alleviated any 
suspicion of criminality.  While the officer’s initial suspicion of 
criminal activity was quite reasonable, his fears were quickly 
dispelled and no additional facts arose during the encounter to 
support a revitalized reasonable belief of criminality.122  
  
 118 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). 
 119 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2001) (the statutory language contains no 
provision which allows for circumvention of the name requirement in a situation where 
the officer’s initial suspicion has dissipated). 
 120 325 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Or. 2004). 
 121 Id. at 1171. 
 122 Id.  
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Therefore, the court in Martiszus concluded that the intrusion 
was unreasonable in so far as it lasted beyond the vitality of 
the officer’s initial finding of reasonable suspicion.123  As stated 
in Martiszus, “Though an officer’s detention may have been 
justified at its inception, the detention exceeds Terry 
boundaries when it continues unreasonably despite dissipation 
of the officer’s initial suspicion.”124  Therefore, the statute at 
issue in Hiibel is unreasonable.  Nevada’s stop and identify 
statute impermissibly requires identification from all those 
detained pursuant to a reasonable suspicion of criminality, 
even in the far from uncommon instance where the reasonable 
suspicion which served as the predicate for the stop has been 
alleviated.  The paradigm of the Fourth Amendment is entirely 
inconsistent with such an intrusive requirement.   
VI. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES 
If the ideals embodied in the Fourth Amendment are to 
be respected, compelled identification pursuant to a mere 
reasonable suspicion of criminality must be deemed 
unreasonable.  However, short of an outright ban on compelled 
identification, there exist methods of narrowly tailoring a 
compulsory identification requirement so as to lessen the 
intrusion upon the rights of the individual.  The flexibility of 
our federalist system of governance grants the individual 
states the freedom to pursue their own legislative initiatives.  
Admittedly, a “hundred flowers” approach125 to a hot-button 
issue like crime prevention and officer safety, especially in 
today’s charged political climate, may seem an especially 
combustible issue for elected officials wary of appearing weak 
on crime.126  However, if the guarantees of the Fourth 
  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 1169. 
 125 During a brief two-year period in the mid nineteen fifties, Mao Zedong 
encouraged Chinese intellectuals to openly discuss the nation’s problems and formulate 
alternative problem-solving approaches in order to strengthen Chinese society.  Mao’s 
brief flirtation with intellectual freedom and a democratic approach to governance was 
inspired by a poetic passage which read, “Let a hundred flowers bloom: let a hundred 
schools of thought contend.”  Hundred Flowers Campaign, Nation Master 
Encyclopedia, available at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Hundred-
Flowers-Campaign (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
 126 Consider that polling conducted by the New York Times in conjunction 
with CBS News in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 found that 
seventy percent of Americans were willing to surrender personal freedoms in order to 
make the nation safer.  YALE KASMIR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 374 (10th 
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Amendment are to remain viable, it is imperative that 
legislation be structured so as to best protect the respect for the 
integrity of the individual which exists as the bedrock principle 
of the American institution of governance. 
The least constitutionally offensive method of 
formulating a compelled identification statute is to tailor the 
requirement to allow the suspect the initial opportunity to 
dispel the officer’s suspicions before a demand for identification 
becomes compulsory.  Using this legislative archetype, it is only 
after the officer’s investigation and the initial interaction with 
the suspect has failed to adequately alleviate suspicion that a 
request for identification must be obeyed.  Such a statute 
would prevent a citizen who has engaged in entirely lawful 
conduct, mistakenly misinterpreted as criminal, from being 
compelled to needlessly endure the substantial intrusion 
constituted by involuntary revelation of identity.  Offering the 
citizenry an initial opportunity to dispel the officer’s suspicion 
would go a long way in curing the overreaching that plagues 
the statute at issue in Hiibel.  Before subjecting a person to the 
harrowing experience of custodial arrest,127 legislatures would 
be better served if they drafted legislation whereby compelled 
identification, followed by arrest for noncompliance, was a 
tactic of last resort to be utilized only when traditional 
investigative methods fail to dispel suspicion.  Consider Welsh 
v. Wisconsin, where the Supreme Court held that the 
legislature’s decision not to impose incarceration for a statutory 
infraction is the best indicator of the state’s level of interest in 
taking custody of individuals who commit a violation.128  Thus, 
the fact that Nevada merely imposes a monetary fine upon 
obtaining a conviction for failure to identify is further evidence 
of the appropriateness of compelling identification only after 
granting the suspect an opportunity to dispel suspicion.  Since 
arrest for failure to identify would not seem to be a pressing 
state interest, legislatures should afford a detained suspect the 
  
ed. 2002).  See also, Harris, supra note 80, at 39 (“[I]t is hardly surprising to find that 
most people would support crime-fighting efforts of questionable constitutionality.”). 
 127 Arrest is highly intrusive in that it grants the right to use force to affect 
the arrest, to transport the person to the police station, and to handcuff, book, and 
fingerprint the person.  Arrest also authorizes police to detain the arrestee for a 
prolonged period prior to presentation before a magistrate. Brief of Amici Curiae 
American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners, at 21, Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408). 
 128 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1986). 
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opportunity to dispel suspicion before an identification demand 
becomes compulsory. 
Admittedly, the legislative proposal detailed above may 
appear somewhat inadequate in that it fails to sufficiently 
protect the officer conducting the investigative stop.  However, 
municipalities attempting to better ensure officer safety should 
not adopt measures which require suspects to identify 
themselves to law enforcement as a preliminary matter during 
each and every investigative stop.  Such a blanket, automatic 
identification requirement is far too invasive.  Rather, states 
should adopt legislation that incorporates the ideals 
encompassed in the automatic frisk doctrine in order to better 
balance individual integrity with the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement.  
As previously discussed, the Terry court specifically 
authorized the frisking of a suspect detained pursuant to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality only when there exists a 
reasonable fear for officer safety.129  In Sibron v. New York the 
Court opined that officers have an automatic right to frisk a 
suspect in one of two situations; either the suspect exhibits 
some outward sign of being armed or the suspected crime, by 
its very nature, is one of violence.130  Over time, case law has 
begun to expand the circumstances in which automatic frisk is 
permissible.  In addition to the situation where the crime 
suspected is an inherently violent offense, when the offense 
suspected is one that involves the mere possibility of armed 
violence, a search in the form of a frisk is permissible.131  
Additionally, persons suspected of a drug crime, even be it a 
minor offense, may be frisked immediately upon detention 
  
 129 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). In Terry, the Court concluded that 
since the suspects had been observed in what appeared to be preparation for a robbery, 
an offense “likely to involve the use of weapons,” the investigating officer acted 
properly in conducting a frisk.  Id.   
 130 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (“In the case of a self-protective 
search for weapons, [a police officer] must be able to point to particular facts from 
which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.”); Id. at 74 
(Harlan, J., concurring)  (“[T]he right to frisk is automatic when an officer lawfully 
stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a substantial likelihood that 
he is armed. . . .”).  See also Harris supra note 74, at 4, 5 (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
always maintained that police could perform frisks – pat down searches of the outer 
clothing of suspects – only if the officer suspected a violent crime was afoot, or if the 
individual suspect showed some sign of being armed and dangerous.”). 
 131 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972).  In Adams, an informant 
apprised police officers that a person seated in a nearby automobile was carrying a 
handgun, prompting the officers to approach the individual.  When the suspect ignored 
instructions to exit the vehicle, the officer removed a gun from the suspect’s waistband. 
Id. 
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regardless of whether they exhibit any tell-tale signs of danger 
to the investigating officer.132   The propensity for burglars to 
carry instruments capable of inflicting harm has resulted in 
burglary also being treated as an offense authorizing automatic 
frisk.133  Furthermore, numerous cases hold that law 
enforcement personnel may frisk persons “based not on the 
crime or outward signs that the suspect may be armed, but 
because the situation presents the police with circumstances 
detrimental to their safety.”134   
Adoption of compelled identification legislation which 
embodies the ideals of the automatic frisk doctrine is far more 
compatible with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the 
intrusive statute at issue in Hiibel.  A prominent justification 
put forth by the Hiibel majority in upholding the Nevada 
statute was the idea that compelled identification increases 
officer safety.135  Thus, aligning the rationale of the Hiibel 
majority with the extensive body of automatic frisk cases, an 
officer performing an investigative stop pursuant to a 
reasonable suspicion would be permitted to issue a compulsory 
demand for identification only when the suspected offense is 
one which carries a propensity for violence or the specific 
factual circumstances of the stop are such that there exists a 
reasonable fear for officer safety.  The wide array of offenses 
which have been viewed by various courts as sufficient to 
authorize an automatic frisk provide a sufficient framework for 
instances when compelled identification should be deemed 
permissible.   
Of course, adoption of the proposal set forth above 
would dictate that Larry Hiibel, a suspect in an alleged assault, 
  
 132 See Harris, supra note 80, at 24 (describing weapons as tools of the trade 
for narcotics trafficking, thus justifying frisk of suspected drug offenders upon 
detainment).  See also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(“Since weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions, the 
officers reasonably believed that the individuals with whom they were dealing were 
armed and dangerous.”). 
 133 See, e.g., Gutierres v. State, 793 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1990) (“While burglary is 
not per se a crime of violence, it is a serious crime and . . . someone suspected of 
burglary would carry a weapon and resort to violence.”).  See also, Harris, supra note 
80 at 26-27 (“Courts frequently allow automatic frisks of burglary suspects . . . .  As 
with narcotics cases, the reasoning is that those involved might have weapons.”). 
 134 Harris, supra note 80, at 31.  Factors highlighted as authorizing frisk in 
such circumstances include presence in a high crime locale, a larger number of suspects 
than officers, darkness, etc.  Id. 
 135 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (Police “need 
to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their 
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.”). 
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would still be required to identify himself to the investigating 
deputy.  However, such an approach is far more desirable than 
the automatic identification requirement upheld in Hiibel.  
Persons not suspected of a crime likely to pose a threat to the 
officer would not be needlessly compelled to reveal their 
identity.  Just as an automatic frisk is not authorized in 
accordance with every Terry stop, offenses which do not present 
a reasonable fear for officer safety should not grant an 
automatic right to compel identification.  For instance, persons 
suspected of loitering, littering, or a host of other similarly 
trivial offenses do not inherently pose danger to the 
investigating officer.  Therefore, compelling identification in 
such instances cannot be said to appreciably increase officer 
safety to the point where the intrusion upon the individual is 
justified.  As with a frisk, if the offense which serves as a 
predicate for the Terry stop is insufficient to create a 
reasonable fear for officer safety, but the circumstances of the 
stop (i.e. suspect’s demeanor and behavior as the investigative 
stop unfolds) reasonably creates such fear, compelled 
identification could then be required.136  
One need not worry that limiting the instances in which 
compelled identification is allowable and requiring officers to 
justify their decisions to compel identification will substantially 
expose police officers to harm.  In a hearing to adjudicate an 
allegation that a suspect was illegally searched during the 
course of a Terry stop, testimony given by police officers is 
entitled substantial deference.137  While the police officer may 
be called upon to explain what made the situation appear 
sufficiently dangerous to warrant a frisk, law enforcement is 
rarely, if ever, required to submit statistics in support of its 
assumption that a particular class of suspect poses a threat.138  
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly instructed lower courts to 
defer to the testimony by police, holding that evidence “must be 
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, 
but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
  
 136 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“If 
the nature of the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer’s 
safety, I would not permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so.”). 
 137 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
 138 Harris, supra note 80, at 33 (“Seldom, if ever, do police supply any data 
substantiating their assumptions that the suspect was armed and dangerous; rather, it 
is simply assumed.”). 
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enforcement.”139  Thus, if similar deference is afforded the 
testimony given by officers called upon to explain their 
rationale for compelling identification, police will retain the 
ability to respond to the threats which confront them in the 
field, and the integrity of the individual subjected to the 
detention will not be unnecessarily trampled.   
Irrespective of the particulars of the stop and identify 
statute adopted by a particular jurisdiction, no record of the 
citizen-police encounter should be made if the investigative 
stop ultimately proves unfounded or fruitless.  As previously 
discussed, the feeling that the authorities are consciously 
documenting an individual’s activities has a dramatic adverse 
effect on the mental well-being of the populace.  In order to 
lessen the psychic trauma of the encounter, when an 
investigative stop fails to produce justification for continued 
detainment, no permanent record should be made of the 
encounter.  Inevitably, adoption of such a policy would mean 
that a certain number of criminally inclined individuals, either 
clever enough to dispel an officer’s well-founded suspicions or 
fortunate enough to have encountered the officer in a situation 
where continued detainment is legally impermissible, might 
perhaps benefit from the opportunity to avoid documentation.  
While such an occurrence is truly unfortunate, this is an 
unavoidable burden that society must shoulder in order to live 
in an environment sufficiently respectful of individual integrity 
and freedom.140  
Furthermore, an officer who remained suspicious of an 
individual detained during a Terry stop is not without recourse.  
Even if the suspect’s identity were to go undocumented at the 
conclusion of the fruitless Terry stop, a record of the encounter 
could still be gleaned by other means.  Should an officer feel 
that such action is warranted, there has never existed any 
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which would 
prevent an officer remaining suspicious of an individual 
detained during a Terry stop from continuing to observe the 
  
 139 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.  Further evidencing the degree of deference 
deemed appropriate, the Court in Cortez advanced the rationale that judgments made 
by officers in the field are not to be viewed in isolation with the benefit of hindsight 
analysis.  Instead, the Court stated that “the totality of the circumstances – the whole 
picture – must be taken into account.” Id. at 417-18. 
 140 English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone, a champion of egalitarian 
justice, famously opined that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one 
innocent suffer.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358 (GARLAND PUBL’G 
1978). 
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suspect even after the investigative detention has concluded.141  
Practically speaking, such continued observation will 
frequently result in the documentation of a license plate 
number or street address from which the officer could 
accurately record his interaction with the suspect without 
having to rely on information gained through compulsion.  
Legislation of this sort, in which the identity of the individual 
is not recorded when the Terry stop proves fruitless, is far more 
desirable than that adopted in Nevada because it better 
respects individual integrity by seeking to lessen the 
psychological harm occasioned by compelled revelation of 
identity.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the very earliest days of the Union, our nation has 
rested on a foundation grounded in the bedrock of personal 
freedom and respect for the individual.  While on its face the 
Fourth Amendment outlines proscriptions against oppressive 
government action, at its very core, the prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure seeks to protect personal 
integrity and individual sanctity.  At a very fundamental level, 
the compulsory identification statute at issue in Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District of Nevada is an assault on individual 
integrity.  In upholding the Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel, 
the Supreme Court not only upset the delicate balance struck 
by the Terry Court between the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement and the integrity of the individual citizen, but also 
blatantly disregarded the implicit ideals set forth by the 
founders in adopting the provisions of the Fourth Amendment.  
However, while the Supreme Court’s ratification of the Nevada 
statute may seem a damaging blow to the personal freedoms 
espoused in the Bill of Rights, diligence on the part of the 
citizenry in demanding that our elected representatives remain 
faithful to the most basic principles of our nation can lessen the 
impact of the Court’s mistake.  President Dwight Eisenhower 
once stated “There is nothing wrong with America that the 
faith, love of freedom, intelligence and energy of her citizens 
  
 141 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (describing an officer’s 
procedure of observing persons he should encounter as “routine”).   
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cannot cure.”142  Through insistence upon stop and identify 
statutes more consistent with the Constitution’s ideals, the 
citizenry has an opportunity to prove Eisenhower’s inspiring 
commentary entirely accurate. 
William H. Weisman† 
  
 142 Quote of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, unattributed, available at 
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?homesearch=freedom&page=6 (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
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